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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE-RES JUDICATA
Right of Insurer to Effect a Binding Settlement on Insured
In the case of Eller v. Blackwelder,1 the plaintiff filed a
motion for judgment seeking damages sustained in an auto-
mobile accident with the defendant. The trial court upheld
defendant's allegations of res judicata since the plaintiff's
insurance company had effected a settlement with the de-
fendant for damages for the same accident in a former
action. A dismissed agreed order was entered in that action.
On writ of error, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that
an insurance carrier could settle a cause of action against
it's insured, but had no "authority, express or implied, to
settle a claim" which the insured might have against an-
other where the -insured did not participate, consent to, or
have knowledge of the insurance carrier's settlement.2
The rule pronounced by the Supreme Court of Appeals
is universally recognized when the settlement is consum-
mated before a claim against the insured has been formulat-
ed in an action.3 Even when the settlement is effected after
the party has instituted an action against the insured, the
majority of the courts have reached the same result.4 The
I Eller v. Blackwelder, 204 Va. 292, 189 S.E.2d 426 (1963).
2 Id. at 295, 130 S.E.2d at 429.
3 Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 937 (1957); Arkansas-Fikes v. Johnson, 220
Ark. 448, 248 S.E.2d 908 (1962); Kansas-Graves Truck Line,
Inc. v. Home Oil Co., 181 Kan. 507, 312 P.2d 1079 (1957) ; Missouri
-Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S.W. 751 (1917);
New Jersey-Klotz v. Lee, 36 N.J. Super. 6, 114 A.2d 746 (1955);
North Carolina-Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132, 108 S.E.2d
535 (1959); Tennessee-Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 385, 68
S.E.2d 127 (1933).
4 Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 939 (1953); Georgia-U.S.A.C. Transport v.
Corley, 202 F.2d 8 (5th Cir., 1953); New Hampshire-Perry v.
Faulkner, 98 N.H. 474, 102 A.2d 908 (1954); New Jersey-
Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695 (1952) ; North
Carolina-Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713, 110 S.E.2d 316 (1959);
Tennessee-Chattanooga v. Ballew, 49 Tenn. App. 310, 354 S.W.2d
806 (1961); Wisconsin-Heineman Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee
Auto Ins. Co., 270 Wis. 443, 71 N.W.2d 395, 72 N.W.2d 102 (1955).
Contra, Massachusetts-Long v. Union Indemnity, 277 Mass. 428,
178 N.E. 737 (1931); changed by Mass. Ann. Laws, Ch. 231,
§ 140-A (1952); Missouri-Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244




courts here reason that the insurance policy alone does
not impliedly authorize the insurance company to make a
settlement prejudicial to the insured's rights against a
third party.5 Furthermore, the mere existence of an inde-
pendently negotiated settlement by the insurer with the
third party does not constitute prima facie proof that the
insurer acted as the insured's agent in consummation of
the settlement.6 However, three additional factors will
establish prima facie evidence of an agency relationship
thus barring the insured's cause of action even though the
settlement was negotiated without his knowledge, participa-
tion, or consent.
The first essential factor to establish an agency relation-
ship between insurer and insured is service of process on
the -insured in order to have jurisdiction over his person.
In several cases where the courts held the insured's right
of action was not barred by the insurance company's settle-
ment, the insured was not served with process.7 This pre-
requisite was met in the Eller case as the plaintiff was
served personally and subsequently gave the process to the
insurance carrier in accordance with the terms of the policy.
Next, there must be some consultation by the insurance
carrier or its attorney with the insured. An agency relation-
ship cannot be predicated on the mere relationship of in-
surer and insured. Therefore, the courts have negated any
existence of agency where there was no consultation with
the insured," or if the "insurance agent stated that neither
the witness nor anyone else with the company discussed
with the insured the nature of the action." 9 On the con-
trary, in Eller v. Blackwelder, the insurance attorney filed
defenses for the insured.
5 Faught v. Washman, 329 S.W.2d 588, 594 (1959), Neineman
Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 270 Wisc. 443, 71
N.W.2d 395, 400 (1955).
6 Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695, 698 (1952).
7 American, Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202,
108 S.W.2d 187, 190 (1937); Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700,
701 (1954).
S Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N.J. Super. 95, 86 A.2d 695, 697 (1952).
9 U.S.A.C. Transport v. Corley, 292 F.2d 8, 11 (5th Cir., 1953).
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Finally, the insured must acquiesce and make no pro-
testations of nonliability to the insurance company. The in-
sured has reason to know by his contract of insurance that
some action might be taken by the insurer against him
without his consent.10 A disclaimer of liability to the in-
surance carrier thus precludes the defenses of estoppel and
res judicata. Although in the Eller case the insured pro-
tested his nonliability immediately by filing a motion for
judgment against the third party, there is no evidence from
the pleadings or record that a disclaimer of liability was
directed to the insurance carrier." The disclaimer of
liability is the key to the rule that "where the insurer settles
a claim against the insured over the latter's protest that he
was not at fault, the insured may still maintain his action
against the tort feasor.' 12
Service of process on the insured coupled with consulta-
tion by the insurance company with the insured as to the
merits without any disclaimer of liability by the insured to
the insurer should warrant an exception to the general
rule that an insurance company has no authority, express
or implied, to release a claim of the insured against a third
party.13 These factors are instrumental in determining the
insurer's authority. The court's reasoning in the Eller case,
however, only emphasized the fact that the insured did not
consent to the insurer's settlement.
10 Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 101, 1002 (1951).
11 Eller v. Blackwelder, 204 Va. 292, 130 S.E.2d 426 (1963).
12 Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S.W.2d 362, 364 (1952).
13 Eller v. Blackwelder, 204 Va. 292, 130 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1963).
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